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REVISION OF CANON ELEVEN
logically have formed the basis of the Court's decision. Thus, had Jus-
tice Black not chosen to embark on a tortuous linguistic search for
"power," he might well have found the answer to the foreclosure issue
by asking three simple questions: Did the defendant's questionable con-
duct result in any sales within the prefabricated home market? If so, were
there enough of these sales to make the defendant's competitors in that
market seek to establish a similar mode of conduct? Finally, was that
mode of conduct unavailable to these competitors? An affirmative answer
to these questions would establish foreclosure; if the defendant were un-
able to provide some overriding justification, the balance could be log-
ically struck against him, and his conduct declared unlawful.
KENNETH B. Hipp
Attorney and Client-Dealing with Clients' Property-the ABA
Revision of Canon Eleven
Historically, the attorney-client relationship has been one of delicate
trust, as observed by Justice Nelson in 1850:
There are few of the business relations of life involving a higher
trust and confidence than that of attorney and client, or, generally
speaking, one more honorably and faithfully discharged; few more
anxiously guarded by the law, or governed by sterner principles of
morality and justice; and it is the duty of the court to administer them
in a corresponding spirit .... 1
A recent Iowa case, Nadler v. Treptow,2 illustrates the ethical ques-
tions arising when an attorney becomes interested in his client's property.
Attorney Nadler represented Elease Treptow in, among other matters, a
contract for the purchase of real property from the estate of one Pappas.
Financial difficulties prevented Mrs. Treptow's meeting her three-hundred-
dollar-per-month contractual obligation to the estate. Because the "prob-
lem was complicated,"' 3 Nadler was able to purchase from the Pappas
estate at an eight-hundred-dollar reduction the interest that his client
had sought. At least one complication of which the court spoke was the
prior contract with Mrs. Treptow. Through it, presumably, Nadler
learned of the factors that caused the reduction in price: The attorney-
client relationship became one of debtor-creditor/contract vendor.4 Nadler
Stockton v. Ford, 52 U.S. 232, 247 (1850).
'- Iowa -, 166 N.W.2d 103 (1969).
Id. at - , 166 N.W.2d at 108 (dissenting opinion).
'Id.
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then brought an action against his client for his full fee; she defended by
asserting a breach of the fiduciary duty stemming from the lawyer-client
relationship. The trial court found that the attorney's purchase was not
against the interest of his client5 and granted him recovery of one thousand
dollars, which was fifty-four per cent of the fee sought. A majority of the
Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed, commenting, "[w]e cannot say that
the [trial] court's findings and conclusions were without support in the
evidence."'
Four members of the court disagreed: "Both the municipal court and
the majority opinion completely ignore the fiduciary relationship of this
plaintiff to defendant, his client."7 The dissent would have applied Canon
Eleven of the American Bar Association's Canons of Professional Ethics,
which provides:
Dealing with Trust Property. The lawyer should refrain from any
action whereby for his own personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes
advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client.8
The basic policy underlying the dissent in Nadler as well as Canon
Eleven is that once the client's confidence is reposed in his attorney, the
latter should not be able to use it to his client's detriment or prejudice.'
Otherwise stated,
In America, where the stability of the courts and of all departments of
government rests upon the approval of the people, it is peculiarly es-
sential that the system for establishing and dispensing justice be ...
so maintained that the public shall have absolute confidence in the in-
tegrity and impartiality of its administration.... It cannot be so main-
tained unless the conduct and motives of [the men] of our profession
are such as to merit the approval of all just men.' 0
The American Bar Association Standing Committee on Professional
Ethics has stated that generally it is improper for an attorney to purchase
Id. at - 166 N.W.2d at 104.0 Id. at - 166 N.W.2d at 105.
Id. at - 166 N.W.2d at 106 (dissenting opinion).
I ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 11. The Supreme Court of Iowa
has adopted the ABA Canons, with the exception of a portion of Canon 27. IowA
CODE ANN., appendix to § 610, rule 119 (Supp. 1969). Prior to August, 1969, forty-
one states and the District of Columbia had adopted the ABA Canons. Letter
from Frederick R. Franklin, ABA Staff Director for Professional Standards, to
J. Michael Brown, November 13, 1969 [hereinafter cited as Franklin Letter].
'Stockton v. Ford, 52 U.S. 232, 247 (1850)." Preambk to ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS.
[Vol. 48
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assets from an estate that he is representing." The New York City Bar
Committee has commented that the entire area of an attorney's dealing in
his client's property is "fraught with danger."'" Suspension of the at-
torney by a state bar association for breach of the fiduciary duty has been
upheld in several instances."
The practical application of Canon Eleven often places stringent re-
quirements on the attorney. Courts are particularly inquiring when an
attorney purports to represent a client and then takes title to property in
his own name. 4 The purchase of a client's property has been allowed in
several cases in which no confidence was breached and the attorney-client
relationship had ended. 5 But courts have invoked the fiduciary relation-
ship in patent infringement suits by clients against their attorneys, 6
and attorneys have been denied the right to purchase a client's real prop-
erty at a foreclosure sale17 or from an estate.' The protection extends to
corporate clients; 19 an attorney may not purchase interests adverse to
those of the corporation he represents. 20 Courts have likewise unmasked
the subterfuge of third-party purchases for the attorney's benefit.2
Transactions between attorney and client, if disputed, have been con-
sidered prima facie fraudulent and invalid. Recurrently, a presumption
"ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 667 (1963) ; accord,
id. No. 250 (1943).
"' WILLIAM NELSON CROMWELL FOUNDATION, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEES
ON PROFESSIONAL ETHIcS OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK AND THE NEW
YORK COUNTY LAWYERS' AssociATIoN 291 (1956).
" Lowe v. State Bar, 40 Cal. 2d 564, 254 P.2d 506 (1953) ; Sunderlin v. State
Bar, 33 Cal. 2d 785, 205 P.2d 382 (1949) ; In re Sandblast, 210 Ore. 65, 307 P.2d 532
(1957).
" Mebane v. Broadnax, 183 N.C. 333, 111 S.E. 627 (1922).
"Waters v. Bruner, 355 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. 1962); Minchen v. Arment, 266
S.W.2d 257 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
" Reush v. Fischer, 49 F.2d 818 (C.C.P.A. 1931); Goodrum v. Clement, 277
F. 586 (D.C. Cir. 1921); Bumgardner v. Hudson, 277 F. 552 (D.C. Cir. 1921).
" Gaffney v. Harmon, 405 Ill. 273, 90 N.E.2d 785 (1950) ; Vrooman v. Haw-
baker, 377 Ill. 428, 56 N.E.2d 623 (1944) ; Carson v. Fogg, 34 Wash. 444, 76 P. 112
(1904). Contra, Kelly v. Weir, 243 F. Supp. 588 (E. D. Ark. 1965). In this case
an attorney was allowed to purchase his client's real estate at a foreclosure sale that
commenced when the client, against the advice of the attorney, repeatedly refused
to comply with the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, which limited crop pro-
duction per acre and gave the government the right to foreclose for non-com-
pliance with the Act.
"Healy v. Gray, 184 Iowa 111, 168 N.W. 222 (1918); Deal v. Migoski, 122
So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1960); In re Sandblast, 210 Ore. 65, 307 P.2d 532 (1957).
" Oil, Inc. v. Martin, 381 Ill. 11, 44 N.E.2d 596 (1942).
"Sea Cove Marina, Inc. v. Uhlendorf, 18 App. Div. 2d 1021, 239 N.Y.S.2d 29,
aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 714, 204 N.E.2d 499, 256 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1965).
" Demmel v. Hammett, 360 Mo. 737, 230 S.W.2d 686 (1950) ; Gragg v. Pruitt,
179 Okla. 369, 65 P.2d 994 (1936).
"See, e.g., Baker v. Otto, 180 Md. 53, 55, 22 A.2d 924, 925 (1941).
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of fraud arises,23 and the burden is on the attorney to show that no ad-
vantage has been taken. 4 The transaction may be saved only if the
attorney has fully informed his client of his intentions25 and obtained his
consent,26 and if adequate consideration supports the exchange of prop-
erty. 7 One court has gone as far as to say that without consent the
transaction "is vitiated by the law, irrespective of its merits, fairness, or
good faith.
' 28
Although the dissent in Nadler pointed out that "[n]ot once did
plaintiff clearly show just when and under what circumstances he ad-
vised defendant he was going to become her creditor-contract vendor, '20
the trial court found as a fact that full disclosure was made and that the
purchase could actually be to her benefit.8 0 The supreme court recognized
that disclosure to the client was required and affirmed the trial court's
findings, but neglected in its discussion to detail just how Nadler met
the standard. Nadler, therefore, received lenient treatment by the ma-
jority: He was not required to show affirmatively either his disclosure
or the lack of harm to his client; it is uncertain whether he in fact com-
pletely revealed his interest in the property to Mrs. Treptow ;31 and he
concededly did not pay adequate consideration.
If Nadler's conduct violated or was at least questionable under the
ethical standards of his profession, what was the appropriate remedy?
The procedural setting complicates this question, for Mrs. Treptow first
complained of her attorney's ethics when he sued her for his fee. One
remedy could have been a declaration by the court that the property be
held in a constructive trust in favor of the client, as illustrated in Healy
v. Gray.82 Gray, an attorney, represented Healy to secure his appoint-
8 Lawrence v. Tschirgi, 244 Iowa 386, 57 N.W.2d 46 (1953) ; Reeder v. Lund,
213 Iowa 300, 236 N.W. 40 (1931); Baird v. Laycock, 94 S.W.2d 1185 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1936).
2, Swaim v. Martin, 158 Ark. 469, 251 S.W. 26 (1923); G. WARVELLE, ESSAYS
rn LEGAL ETHIcs 155-56 (2d ed. 1920).
" Allison v. Caruthers, 205 Okla. 582, 239 P.2d 759 (1952).
.Demmel v. Hammett, 360 Mo. 737, 230 S.W.2d 686 (1950); It re Sandblast,
210 Ore. 65, 307 P.2d 532 (1957).
2' "It is essential that the sale should be at a price which is fair and reasonable."
Littleton v. Kincaid, 179 F.2d 848, 858 (4th Cir. 1950); see Deal v. Migoski, 122
So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1960).
28 Gragg v. Pruitt, 179 Okla. 369, 372, 65 P.2d 994, 997 (1936).
21 Iowa at - , 166 N.W.2d at 108 (dissenting opinion).
80 Id. at - , 166 N.W.2d at 104.
"The majority (id. at - , 166 N.W.2d at 104) and the dissent (id. at -,
166 N.W.2d at 108) disagreed on this point."2 184 Iowa 111, 168 N.W. 222 (1918).
[Vol. 48
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ment as executor of his father's estate. As a result of this attorney-client
relationship, Gray became aware of and purchased property, which had
first been offered to his client, at five-hundred sixty dollars below the
market price. The court declared a constructive trust in favor of the
client. Arguably, had Mrs. Treptow pursued this course of action, she
might have prevailed as did the plaintiff in Healy; however, she sought
only to deny Nadler his fee.
Perhaps the best deterrent to questionable conduct is to deny the at-
torney compensation. Courts in various situations have followed the
maxim that "[a]n attorney's right to compensation may be defeated by
fraud or misconduct on his part.""3 In Donaldson v. Eaton & Estes"
the plaintiff was allowed to reclaim a large part of an attorney's fee that
the court determined to be in excess of just compensation. The court
stated that "[a]n attorney who acts in bad faith and seeks to secure his
personal advantage to the prejudice of his client may properly be denied
compensation for his services."" Perhaps the majority in Nadler in-
vented its own solution, the fifty-four per cent recovery being its Solomonic
estimate of just compensation. 0
The entire realm of legal ethics, including the attorney-client rela-
tionship, was re-examined by the American Bar Association at the 1969
Dallas Convention; and the existing canons were revised into a new Code
of Professional Responsibility.37 The Special Committee on Evaluation
of Ethical Standards noted four dissatisfactions with the old Canons: (1)
incomplete coverage of attorney misconduct; (2) a need for editorial re-
vision; (3) a lack of practical sanctions; and (4) modern social changes
23 7 C.J.S. Attorwy and Client § 167(c) (1937). See, e.g., Shelton v. Gwathemy,
201 Misc. 75, 107 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct. 1951) ; Duffy v. Colonial Trust Co., 287
Pa. 348, 135 A. 204 (1926); Royden v. Ardoin, 160 Tex. 342, 331 S.W.2d 206
(1960).
136 Iowa 650, 114 N.W. 19 (1907).
Id. at 656, 114 N.W. at 21.
'0 The trial court gave great weight to testimony that Nadler told Mrs. Treptow
that she owed him one-thousand dollars. - Iowa at - , 166 N.W.2d at 105.
"' The new Code will become effective only if courts and bar associations in
individual states choose to adopt it. The Franklin Letter, supra note 8, states:
As for the Code of Professional Responsibility, our information is that to
date the bar associations of Arkansas, Vermont, and New York have adopted
the Code. However, it is actively being considered by numerous other states
and, as noted in the attachment, several states [Arizona, Nevada, New
Mexico, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and perhaps Kentucky]
automatically adopt the rules of ethics of the American Bar Association as
they are promulgated from time to time. Therefore, on January 1, 1970, the
date on which the Code of Professional Responsibility will become effective
for ABA members, the Code will automatically go into effect in those states.
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demanding re-evaluation of ethical standards.3 A totally new format
evolved, embodying three levels of rules with varying degrees of speci-
ficity. First are the nine "Canons," intended as "statements of axiomatic
norms [or] . ..general concepts." 9 The "Ethical Considerations" ap-
plicable to each Canon attempt to offer more specific guidance. Finally,
the "Disciplinary Rules" provide a "minimum level of conduct below
which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action,"4
although no specific procedures and penalties are prescribed. 1
What has become of the old Canon Eleven under the new Code?
It now exists as Canon Four,42 Ethical Consideration 4-5,'18 and Dis-
ciplinary Rule 4-101 (B) .4 Ethical Consideration 4-5 creates two cat-
egories of violations, use of confidential information to the disadvantage
of the client, which is expressly forbidden, and use to the advantage of
the attorney, permitted only if the client consents after a full disclosure.
Disciplinary Rule 4-101 (B) includes the traditional mandates of con-
sent and disclosure,45 but any requirement of full consideration is
omitted. 6
Concerning exchanges of information that must be kept secret, the
Ethical Consideration in point is conveniently vague. It refers only to
"Preface to ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY at v (Final Draft,
July 1, 1969) [hereinafter cited as CODE].
" Preliminary Statement to CODE at 2.
40 Id.
1 "The code makes no attempt to prescribe either disciplinary procedures or
penalties for violation . .. " Id.
' Canon Four provides: A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and
Secrets of a Client.
'3 Ethical Consideration 4-5 provides:
A lawyer should not use information acquired in the course of the
representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client and a lawyer
should not use, except with the consent of his client after a full disclosure,
such information for his own purposes. Likewise, a lawyer should be dili-
gent in his efforts to prevent the misuse of such information by his em-
ployees and associates ....
"Disciplinary Rule 4-101 (B) provides:
Except as permitted by DR 4-101 (C), a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the
client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself
or of a third person, unless the client consents after a full disclosure.
Disciplinary Rule 4-101 (C) deals only with minor exceptions to part (1) of the
above.
"CODE, Disciplinary Rule 4-101 (B) (3).
"A plausible explanation is that the Code does not deal specifically with the
purchase of a client's property. Instead, the Code limits generally the use of a
confidence or secret.
[Vol. 48
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"information acquired during the course of representation. .. ."47 The Dis-
ciplinary Rules are more descriptive: They establish two categories of in-
formation, confidences and secrets, that may not be misused or revealed.
A "confidence" is defined as "information protected by the attorney-client
privilege under applicable law."48 One writer sets forth the general law
of privilege as follows:
It is the essence of the [attorney-client] privilege that it is limited
to those communications as to which the client either expressly made
confidential or which he could reasonably assume under the circum-
stances would be understood by the attorney as so intended.
A mere showing that the communication was from client to at-
torney does not suffice, but the circumstances indicating the intention
of secrecy must appear.49
On the other hand, a "secret" refers to "information gained in the pro-
fessional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the
disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detri-
mental to the client."50
Thus it appears that the definitions of "confidence" and "secret" both
require an intent on the part of the client that the communication remain
confidential. Would the situation in Nadler have fit either definition?
Probably not. It is unlikely that Mrs. Treptow would have been con-
cerned that her purchase agreement with the Pappas estate remain strictly
confidential; the agreement may even have been general knowledge in the
community.
Apparently adding some form of mens rea to the elements of an at-
torney's misconduct, Disciplinary Rule 4-101 (B) prohibits a lawyer
from "knowingly" abusing his client's confidence. Perhaps this rather
perplexing requirement was included to protect a lawyer in those un-
usual instances in which he unknowingly transmits confidential informa-
tion to a third party, has no reason to believe that use of the information
will disadvantage his client, or is unaware that such information is a
"confidence" or "secret" within the definition. This third possibility is
most unlikely, in that it would be arguable that if Nadler did not know
that the information he received was a "confidence" or "secret," he could
not have violated the Code. Such a rule makes ignorance of the law a
'7 CODE, Ethical Consideration 4-5.
"Id., Disciplinary Rule 4-101 (A).
"C. McCoRmi IcK, HANDBOOK OF TME LAW oF EVIDENCE § 95, at 190-91 (1954).
CoDE, Disciplinary Rule 4-101 (A).
1970]
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permissible defense, and such an interpretation of the Code was probably
unintended since an even stricter standard is normally required of at-
torneys than of others. The rule should be more explicit in its use of the
word "knowingly."
Why did the justices in Nadler believe that the attorney's conduct
was unethical? Mrs. Treptow was not harmed; she was financially un-
able to complete her purchase of the property in any event.' The answer
is that such conduct causes injury to the integrity of the legal profession
and judicial system. The essence of the fiduciary relationship is the trust
and confidence a client places in his attorney. Such trust must be pro-
tected by the law, or the effectiveness of the judicial system declines.
Given his unique access to information regarding a client's property, an
attorney should not be allowed to use such information to his own advan-
tage-if for no other reasons than basic notions of fairness and equity.
If, as occurred in Nadler, the lawyer becomes his client's creditor, he can
hardly be expected to conduct the client's affairs with the objective zeal
demanded of the advocate-the lawyer's own pecuniary interests become
bound with those of his client.
In summary, the American Bar Association recently has clarified and
strengthened the fiduciary duties of the attorney wishing to deal in his
client's property. Unfortunately; the revision of the ABA Canons prob-
ably would not aid a court in dealing effectively with the situation before
the Iowa court in Nadler. The concept of breach of a fiduciary duty
owed by an attorney to his client, however, should be used by courts in
the future. Such a court-formed doctrine could be developed as a basis
for allowing a defense seeking reduction or disallowance of an attorney's
fee. Instead of passing lightly over the acts required for fulfillment of the
attorney's fiduciary duty, the Iowa court in Nadler should have established
an explicit precedent in fiduciary misconduct by penalizing the lawyer
financially.
J. MICHAEL BROWN
Constitutional Law-First Amendment Rights-
Flag-Burning As Symbolic Expression
In a period when the first amendment's' protection of the individual
from governmental power is being challenged by new and bizarre methods
t1 - Iowa at - , 166 N.W.2d at 104.
'The first amendment binds the states through the fourteenth amendment.
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
[Vol. 48
